The models and motives behind tomorrow’s transmission expansion.
Major transmission projects based on two distinct models are showing signs of life. What can these projects teach us about future transmission investment?
The absence of long-term transmission rights could exclude potential competition—and cause higher electricity costs.
Power-industry restructuring redistributed financial uncertainties that discourage generation investment and ultimately raise the price of electricity to consumers.
Congress renews PURPA’s call for conservation and load management, but the world has changed since the 1970s.
The “N-word” in the title first appeared in this journal more than 20 years ago, courtesy of the celebrated environmentalist Amory Lovins and his widely quoted piece, “Saving Gigabucks with Negawatts” (Fortnightly, 1985). Scroll forward a few decades. With restructuring of wholesale electric markets at FERC, plus formation of regional transmission organizations and independent system operators, the game was changed.
(October 2005) Xcel Energy named Jacob P. Mercer assistant treasurer for the utility and its operating subsidiaries. Portland General Electric appointed Bill Valach director of investor relations. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chairman Joseph T. Kelliher appointed John S. Moot as the commission's general counsel. PJM Interconnection has realigned responsibilities among five executives. And others...
The bias in RTO markets, and how FERC might fix it.
RTO practice creates less risk and uncertainty over the nominal short-term wholesale price of power, but more risk and uncertainty over the long-term cost of transmission. That spells trouble for the coal-fired plant, sited far off at the mine mouth, needing long-haul transmission over a long-enough term to pay back the capital costs.
Consider the opening of the PJM market, and its effect on prices.
Wholesale competition is working, and the best evidence to date is the savings produced from the opening of the PJM market to competitive power generation from the Midwest. A real-time case study unfolded before our eyes in May and October 2004.
FERC must align the immediate self-interest of profit-maximizing entities with its own view of what is in the public interest.
Two obstacles must be overcome to achieve true competitive markets: reversal of the long-term underinvestment in transmission, and greater clarity in the legal and regulatory environments. How can the industry make the most of a somewhat defensive regulatory posture?
What's behind today's oddball mergers?
Look at the gargantuan, gerrymandered service territories you would get with the latest pending merger deals: Exelon-PSEG, Duke-Cinergy, and Warren Buffet's bid to combine PacifiCorp with his MidAmerican Energy. Now ask yourself if they make any sense.
The SEC denies approval of the AEP/CSW merger. What will that mean for industry consolidation?
What's wrong the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA)? The 1935 act clearly did not contemplate a competitive marketplace for electricity. Legislation should be updated to reflect the prevailing energy economic climate.
Solving the electricity credit malaise.