Chasing the Uncatchable
Why trying to fix mandatory capacity markets is like trying to win a game of Whack-A-Mole (Parts I & II)
Why trying to fix mandatory capacity markets is like trying to win a game of Whack-A-Mole (Parts I & II)
Trying to fix mandatory capacity markets like trying to win at Whack-A-Mole, Part II
How the feds opened the supply side.
Market manipulation versus the right to make a profit.
Understanding the new mosaic of commodities trading regulations.
MISO’s board of directors approved the applications of four new transmission-owning members: Cleco Power, Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, Minnesota Municipal Power Agency, and Prairie Power. As a fully integrated transmission-owning member of MISO, each will participate in MISO’s competitive energy markets and system planning and operating functions.
PJM and MISO ran from the altar once before. Now there’s talk of a shotgun wedding.
A purposeful approach to setting energy prices.
Changes in regulatory requirements, market structures, and operational technologies have introduced complexities that traditional ratemaking approaches can’t address. Poorly designed rates lead to cross-subsidies, inequitable outcomes, and perverse incentives. An objective-based approach can better communicate costs to customers in a way that better serves operations and policy goals.