In “Rate-Base Cleansings: Rolling Over Ratepayers” (November 2005, p.58), Michael Majoros urges state public utility commissions to recognize a refundable regulatory liability for past charges to ratepayers for non-legal asset retirement costs.
Incentives for transmission investment could boost postage-stamp pricing over license-plate rates.
FERC proposed a new set of regulations, under the new section 219 of the Federal Power Act, explaining in broad outline how it might approve generous financial incentives for new investments in transmission—incentives once dubbed as “candy.” As of mid-January, the new NOPR had spawned more industry comment than just about any other FERC proposal in recent memory.
Total shareholder return can not only be a measure of past performance, but it can be harnessed as the prime touchstone for planning future performance.
TSR is a paradox among financial metrics—dominant in assessments of past performance yet peripheral in plans for future performance. This paradox can be resolved.
Chief financial officers discuss new strategies and the possibility of further convergence inside and outside the energy industry.
A whole new cast of characters is expected to enter the energy industry—overseas ventures, telecom firms, insurance companies, and financial-services groups. But even as the future seems to hold boundless opportunity, utility executives and industry experts continue to disagree on what sort of consolidation is right.
Finding and applying the efficient frontier.
Buyers of power-plant assets use a number of tried-and-true approaches to asset valuation, including discounted cash flow and option-pricing models. While the valuation approaches employed generally are sophisticated, they focus almost exclusively on individual assets. Conspicuously missing is consideration of the asset portfolio as a whole. For illustrative purposes, we performed an assessment of a basic new power-plant portfolio. The results are well suited for general risk analysis and risk management, portfolio planning and restructuring, power plant acquisition, development, and divestiture.
FERC must align the immediate self-interest of profit-maximizing entities with its own view of what is in the public interest.
Two obstacles must be overcome to achieve true competitive markets: reversal of the long-term underinvestment in transmission, and greater clarity in the legal and regulatory environments. How can the industry make the most of a somewhat defensive regulatory posture?
Why current estimation models set allowed ROE too low.
A material capital structure mismatch, which occurs frequently, can lead to material misestimates of the appropriate allowed return on equity, perhaps on the order of 2 percentage points. That is, a 9 percent estimate of the cost of equity can imply an allowed rate of return on equity of 11 percent.
People
New Opportunities:
Jack Hawks, EPSA's current vice president of public affairs and planning, took on additional responsibilities as EPSA's acting vice president of policy. He replaced Julie Simon, who left the association to join Constellation Energy Group as a managing director. Hawks previously was vice president, Regulatory Policy, for PG&E National Energy Group.
Commission Watch
IOUs, RTOs duke it out over standardization.
Have regional transmission operators (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) asked for excessive levels of credit from customers, to the extent that the burdensome requirements foreclose full market participation by competitive entities? The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must face that difficult question as it investigates whether to institute a rulemaking on credit-related issues for service provided by ISOs, RTOs, and transmission providers.