Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

One of the most exciting challenges facing electric utilities is the opportunity to participate on the so-called "information highway." Not only is the technology evolving at a dazzling pace, but the opportunities to make or lose money will be staggering. The growth in sales of electricity has been and will be relatively slow compared to the dynamic growth in sales of cable television, information, online, cellular telephone, and other telecommunications services.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has issued its comprehensive notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR) designed to move the wholesale electric industry to a more competitive marketplace. The order, Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public and Transmitting Utilities, weighs in at over 300 pages (Docket Nos.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) set in motion a new round of restructuring for the U.S. electric power industry when it issued its latest Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR).

Real-time Pricing, Not Restructuring

Richard Abdoo's article, "Wisconsin Electric's View of a More Competitive Industry," (Feb. 15, 1995), brought this quote to mind: "We trained

hard. . . . But it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization" (Petronius (em 256 BC).

After Congress enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the electric utility industry focused considerable attention on what seemed the key provisions of the acid rain program: e.g., emission allowance trading. In contrast, the highly technical, seemingly innocuous continuous emission monitoring (CEM) provision received scant attention (em only a few engineers took notice. We now know that emission trading and other supposed key provisions had only a modest impact on utilities.

a comparable cost. But what, exactly, are those "different uses"?

Real-time Pricing, Not Restructuring

Richard Abdoo's article, "Wisconsin Electric's View of a More Competitive Industry," (Feb. 15, 1995), brought this quote to mind: "We trained

hard. . . . But it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization" (Petronius (em 256 BC).

The question I am asked most frequently is "Who will emerge as the 'winners' and 'losers' among today's electric utility companies?" The short answer is painfully simple. The winners will offer the best prices (a.k.a., the low-cost producers). The losers will be unable to cut prices to meet the market (a.k.a., the high-cost producers).

Unfortunately, real-world answers rarely come in black and white. The electric utility industry enjoys less pricing flexibility than one might imagine.

Retail competition will render a substantial fraction of existing electric utility plant worthless. Some estimates are so large that the question of compensation for these so-called "stranded investments" overshadows debate on the value of retail competition. Advocates of compensation frequently appeal to a "regulatory compact." They claim that this compact justifies compensation for utilities on grounds of fairness. The case for fairness, however, is badly flawed. Moreover, compensation may adversely affect the efficiency of markets in which competition is emerging.

The Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) has refused to settle a dispute between Florida Power Corp., an electric utility, and numerous qualified cogenerating facilities (QFs) over pricing terms contained in negotiated purchased-power agreements previously approved as cost-effective. The PSC ruled that interpretation of provisions in negotiated, as opposed to approved standard-offer, contracts between utilities and QFs was a matter for the courts and rejected allegations that review and approval gave the PSC continuing jurisdiction to interpret the contracts.