The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has denied a petition for rehearing filed by the City of Morgan City, LA, contesting the ability of the Rural Utilities Service (RUS), formerly the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), to interfere in the city's condemnation of the service territory of a rural electric cooperative (Case No. 93-4295).
The Maine Public Utilities Commission (PUC) has decided to investigate the need for changes in existing regulations for water rates as a result of "drastically increased" water treatment, filtration, and supply costs. While rejecting calls for immediate changes in rate design, a shift to volumetric interclass cost allocation, and special low-income rate schedules, the PUC decided to open two separate inquiries to determine whether formal rulemakings were required.
Stranded costs are those costs that electric utilities are currently permitted to recover through their rates but whose recovery may be impeded or prevented by the advent of competition in the industry. Estimates of these costs run from the tens to the hundreds of billions of dollars. Should regulators permit utilities to recover stranded costs while they take steps to promote competition in the electric power industry?
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has upheld a Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) ruling that Minnegasco's appliance sales and service business should be charged for the value of goodwill related to Minnegasco's name, reputation, and image. The court also ruled that the cost of responding to emergency gas leak calls should be shared by the utility and its appliance service businesses (Docket Nos. C5-94-1820 and C7-94-1821).
Retail competition will render a substantial fraction of existing electric utility plant worthless. Some estimates are so large that the question of compensation for these so-called "stranded investments" overshadows debate on the value of retail competition. Advocates of compensation frequently appeal to a "regulatory compact." They claim that this compact justifies compensation for utilities on grounds of fairness. The case for fairness, however, is badly flawed. Moreover, compensation may adversely affect the efficiency of markets in which competition is emerging.
Southern California Edison (SoCalEd) has unveiled a plan to slash its electric rates 25 percent by 2000, in anticipation of increased competition. The goal is a "real" price decrease (that is, adjusted for inflation), which translates into a system average price reduction from the present 10.7 cents per kilowatt-hour to below 10 cents. SoCalEd will consider a broad range of initiatives, most of which will require the approval of the California Public Utilites Commission. Included is an immediate rate freeze for residential and small business customers through 1996.
Electric utilities now face the risk that existing assets, costs, or contract commitments may be "stranded" by increased competition, leaving shareholders rather than customers to bear the costs. Have shareholders already been compensated for this risk?
Some argue that shareholders have automatically been compensated for this risk by an allowed rate of return equal to the cost of equity capital determined in efficient capital markets.1 If so, forcing shareholders to bear stranded costs may seem fair.
The Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc. (IPPNY) has released an initial white paper on restructuring the electric industry in New York State. The paper concludes that electric rates in New York are too high and suggests paramount objectives: 1) all customers should enjoy direct access and choice among electric suppliers, and 2) disaggregation of vertically integrated utilities must occur in such a way that the surviving natural monopolies (em the wires businesses (em remain financially indifferent to customer choice of supply.
The question I am asked most frequently is "Who will emerge as the 'winners' and 'losers' among today's electric utility companies?" The short answer is painfully simple. The winners will offer the best prices (a.k.a., the low-cost producers). The losers will be unable to cut prices to meet the market (a.k.a., the high-cost producers).
Unfortunately, real-world answers rarely come in black and white. The electric utility industry enjoys less pricing flexibility than one might imagine.
