Cybersecurity, Reliability & CIP

Given the dynamic nature of cyber threats, we should ask ourselves whether mandatory reliability standards drafted by NERC and approved by FERC can get past the uncertainty created by cumbersome procedures and regulatory delays to provide an effective means of addressing the cyber security threat to the bulk power system. Let’s examine some of the regulatory gaps and risks presented by our current system of NERC and FERC oversight.

Several utility regulatory bodies have initiatives tailored to help secure remote access to the electric power grid from cybercrime. The most notable of these efforts comes from the North American Energy Reliability Corporation (NERC), with the realization of Version 5 of its Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard, which goes into effect on April 1, 2016.

An independent system operator for the distribution network could allow utilities to invest in rooftop solar behind the meter and within territory.

With the local grid infused with distributed generation, static relay settings must yield to a more dynamic approach to ensure network security.

The latest fallout from the April 2013 Metcalf incident: the unprecedented assault with high-powered rifles on PG&E’s Metcalf substation, in Silicon Valley, which disabled 17 of 20 large transformers.